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CASES NOTED
ACTIONS
GROUNDS - BASTARDY - Williams v. State, 223 N.B.2d 343 (N.Y.
1966). - In a case of first impression, an infant brought an action against
the state alleging that the state had failed to provide adequate care and had
negligenty failed to protect ,the health and body of his mother, a mentally
deficent patient in a state hospital The result was the infant's conception
and birth out of wedlock. Damages suffered were claimed to be deprivation
of "property rights," deprivation of a "normal childhood and home life,"
deprivation of "proper parental care, support, and learning," and the social
stigma of illegitimacy. The court held that although a novel caim does not
of itself preclude recovery, the law does not recognize a "wrong" to a bas-
tard caused by permitting its mother to be violated and to bear an illegiti-
mate child. Furthermore, said the court, compensation for such a wrong is
unascertainable.
ASSAULT
RESISTING ARRS - SUFFICENCy OF LEGAL PROCESS - People v. Briggs,
224 N.E.2d 93 (N.Y. 1966). - Defendant forcibly resisted an attempted
execution by a police officer of an arrest warrant that was regular on its
face. After being convicted for assault upon an officer, defendant appealed
on the ground that the warrant was based upon defective underlying infor-
mation, so that it was not a "lawful process or mandat&' as required by the
assault statute. After a reversal on these grounds by the appellate division,
the state took an appeal to the New York Court of Appeals which reversed
the appellate division.
Although the case was one of first impression on its facts, the court
found ample support in prior New York cases for its holding that a legal
process" regular on its face is not a nullity, even though underlying insuffi-
ciencies are later discovered. The court indicated that -the validity of legal
process is properly contested in court, and not by resistance of arrest.
AirORILE AND CLIENT
PRIVILEGE - SUSPENSION FROM PRACTICE - In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp.
360 (E.D. Va. 1967). - An attorney transferred stolen money and a
weapon belonging to his client from the client's safety deposit box to a box
in his own name. He believed that if the Government sought discovery,
the evidence would come within the attorney-client privilege. The district
court en banc found that the attorney's conduct was not within the privilege
since he had taken the initiative in the transfer and found that what he had
tried to suppress was not evidence but fruits of the crime. Furthermore, the
attorney's conduct was violative of Canons 15 and 23 of the Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics of the Virginia State Bar. Since the attorney had sought
advice from other members of the bar and intended to return the stolen
money, the court suspended him from practice before it for eighteen months
rather than remove him permanently.
BANKRUPTCY
RELIEF OF DEBTORS - TRANSFERS, PREFERENCES, AND LIENS - Allied
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Dev. Corp. v. Stephan & Brady, Inc., 371 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1966). -
Appellee obtained a judgment on an unsecured cognovit note ten days after
the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Under Wisconsin law, this judgment
represented a lien against the appellant's real estate. The issue was whether
the bankruptcy court could direct the release of the recorded judgment ob-
tained on a claim dischargeable in bankruptcy and taken subsequent to the
filing of the bankruptcy petition. The court held that such an action was
"necessary" to the full exercise of jurisdiction over the debtor's property
since the presence of the lien constituted an encumbrance which would inter-
fere with sale of the asset.
Under section 314 the bankruptcy court could have enjoined the com-
mencement of suit against the debtor after the petition was filed. The in-
stant case shows that the failure to do so is of little consequence, sincejudgments obtained in such suits can be removed under the general powers
granted to the bankruptcy court. It would thus appear that section 314 in
no way requires the bankruptcy courts to pursue the course of issuing in-junctions against creditors levying subsequent to the filing of a bankruptcy
petition.
RIGHTS OF BANKRUPT - EFFECr OF DISCHARGE - Zwick V. Freemnan,
373 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1967). - In a case of first impression, petitioner,
a licensee under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, failed to pay
for goods received in 295 separate transactions. Subsequently, after having
submitted an approved arrangement in bankruptcy (which automatically
terminates the Commodities Act license), petitioner responded to a com-
plaint served by the Department of Agriculture. The Judicial Officer of
the Department, finding that the transactions were "repeated" and "flagrant"
violations of the Commodities Act and ,that petitioner was "responsibly con-
nected" with -the violations, issued an order barring petitioner from em-
ployment by any licensee under the act for a minimum period of one year.
In affirming the order below, the court of appeals heard petitioner's
contention that the penalty under the Commodities Act contravened a goal
of the Bankruptcy Act - to give the bankrupt a fresh start. The court,
noting that no prior decision could be found involving a conflict between
the Bankruptcy Act and any other federal statute, reasoned that since state
statutes imposing civil penalties upon bankrupts had been held valid, a
fortiori the Commodities Act must be valid where, as here, the conflict in-
volved a penalty which was neither unconscionable nor excessive. The court
further held that the congressional purpose in enacting the Commodities
Act was proper and did not violate the fifth amendment due process clause.
CMvL PROCEDURE
FEDERAL JURISDICTION - PATENTS - Ortrn v. Stanray Corp., 371 F.2d
154 (7th Cir. 1967). - Plaintiff, an Illinois resident, sued defendant, a
Delaware corporation, alleging the infringement of a United States patent,
the breach and wrongful termination of a related assignment agreement,
and the infringement of equivalent patents issued by Canada, Brazil, and
Mexico. On appeal defendant-appellant asserted that he was entitled to a
summary judgment on the first two allegations and argued that federal juris-
diction did not obtain in plaintiff's third allegation. In addition to holding
that a genuine issue of fact existed, thus precluding a granting of summary
judgment on appellant's behalf, the court noted that plaintiff-appellee could
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not rely on international treaties to gain district court jurisdiction of the
foreign patent claim since the applicable treaties were not self-executing.
However, the appellate court affirmed -the jurisdiction of the district court;
implying that although they were not relying on ancillary jurisdiction, the
lower court could very well utilize such jurisdiction to hear the foreign
patent claims.
Prior to the instant case, the Seventh Circuit had limited the scope of
ancillary jurisdiction. By expanding UMWi v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966),
in which the attaching pendent claim was merely one of state law, the deci-
sion reveals a more liberal application of ancillary jurisdiction by the Seventh
Circuit
CONFICTS OF LAW
BRiE DocruNE - CHOICE OF REMEDIES UNDER FEDERAL STATUTE
United States v. Carson, 372 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1967). - Defendant, upon
obtaining a loan for eighteen thousand dollars from plaintiff pursuant to
the Bankhead-Jones Farmer Tenant Act; executed a promissory note payable
to the federal government. The note was secured by a chattel mortgage on
defendanes cattle in conformity with the procedure of Mississippi, defend-
ants domicile. Thereafter, defendant delivered the covered livestock to
co-defendant Ellis who, unaware of the chattel mortgage, sold the stock in
Tennessee for eighteen hundred dollars and retained a fee for his brokerage
services. Defendant became bankrupt and his obligation to plaintiff was
reduced to one thousand dollars. Plaintiff brought this action for conver-
sion in a district court in Tennessee, seeking a consent judgment from de-
fendant and the balance of the sale price from the co-defendant. The district
court, applying Tennessee property law, granted judgment against defend-
ant, but limited recovery against the co-defendant to his commission fee.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the district court and held
the co-defendant liable for the balance of the sale price although he was
unaware of any prior encumbrance. The court held that where the federal
law involved is as far-reaching as is the Government's loan programs, the
courts should apply a uniform rule despite local law to the contrary. In
dictum the court averred that the federal courts should grant that remedy
which will best effectuate the congressional intent despite the doctrine an-
nounced in Erik v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw
DUE PROCESS OF LAW - DBFINITION OF CRIMNAL OFFENSES - City
of Seattle v. Drew, 423 P.2d 522 (Wash. 1967). - Defendant was con-
victed for violation of a Seattle ordinance which provided that it was a
crime for any person loitering about under suspicious circumstances, from
one-half hour after sunset to one-half hour before sunrise, to be unable to
give a satisfactory account of himself upon the demand of any police offi-
cer. Defendant's violation of the ordinance occurred when he passed his
bus stop, alighted from the bus in an unfamiliar neighborhood, lost his way,
and was unable to explain satisfactorily his presence to a police officer.
The policeman arrested the accused, and subsequently defendant was con-
victed in the municipal court. Thereafter, the superior court reversed by
holding the ordinance unconstitutional.
On appeal the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the superior court
and held that the ordinance violated due process of law since it was so
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vague that even conduct which might not manifest an unlawful purpose
would fall within its purview. In so holding, the court adhered to the
"void for vagueness" doctrine - a penal statute or ordinance violates due
process of law if its standards of guilt are so vague that men of common
intelligence are required to guess at its meaning.
DUE PROCESS OF LAw - LicmsEs - Independent Electricians & Elec.
Contractors' Ass'n v. New Jersey Bd. of Examiners of Elec. Contractors, 48
N.J. 113, 226 A.2d 169 (1967). - In this declaratory judgment action,
the constitutionality of a state occupational licensing statute relating to
electrical contractors was challenged as violating substantive due process and
equal protection of the laws. Plaintiffs claimed that the statute on its face
was discriminatory to small contractors and those seeking to enter the field
and that it bore no reasonable relation to the general welfare in that it
did not require the licensee to supervise or inspect the work done by his
employees.
The trial court dismissed, holding that such a provision must necessarily
be read into the statute. The Supreme Court of New Jersey remanded. It
held that the state on remand must introduce facts showing a reasonable
relation between the statutory scheme and the evil sought to be controlled.
By so holding, the court, in effect, put the burden on the state to refute the
plaintiff's prima facie case; the court was unwilling to declare the law in-
valid without a full evidentiary hearing on the due process issue in view
of the heavy presumption of validity.
POST-INDUCTION CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR - DENIAL OF JURISDICTION
- Brown v. McNamara, 263 F. Supp. 686 (D.N.J. 1967). - Subsequent
to induction into the military, petitioner refused to serve because of his
religious convictions. Following Defense Department procedure, statements
by petitioner and others were sent to the Selective Service Director, whose
opinion that petitioner did not qualify as a conscientious objector was sup-
ported by the Adjutant General Petitioner's further refusal to serve re-
sulted in his court martial, after which petitioner filed for a writ of habeas
corpus.
.Emphasizing that a conscientous objector's exemption from normal duty
assignments is not a constitutional right, the court stated that the lack of
provisions for a hearing upon petitioner's application was not a denial of
equal protection, even though pre-induction applicants are given such a
hearing, because the present procedural system provides maximum unifor-
mity of treatment for all post-induction applicants and is adequately cen-
tralized so as not to be influenced by the prejudice of local military units.
The court then refused to accept jurisdiction because the resulting burden
on the military in terms of the length of time such cases would be in the
courts and the immobilization of part of the armed forces outweighed the
possible value of a judicial review.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE - COURTROOM IDENTIFICATION - People V.
Stoner, 55 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1967). - Defendant was convicted of robbery,
based upon his oral confession and a courtroom identification by the victim.
Officers used illegally seized items to induce the confession, and the accused
was required to wear the items at the police "show up" one week after the
robbery. The victim demonstrated, to the satisfaction of the lower court
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which conducted a private hearing, that the identification at trial would be
sufficiently independent of the "show up" identification to be admissible.
In reversing the lower court, the supreme court held that there was no
break in the chain between the illegal search and seizure and defendant's
confession and that thus the primary taint of the search was not purged.
However, in what appears to be dictum, the court found that it would not
extend the fruit-of-an-illegal-search rule to the testimony of the victim, since,
under the circumstances of the case, even if identification of the witness
was dependent in part on the viewing of -the defendant in illegally obtained
clothing at the "show up," it was "sufficiently distinguishable to be purged
of the primary taint."
SELF-INCRIMINATION - COMPULSORY RECORDING OF DEFENDANT'S
VOICE FOR IDENTIFiCATION PURPOsEs - State v. McKenna, 94 N.J. Super.
71, 226 A.2d 757 (Essex County Ct. 1967). - While defendant was under
indictment for several criminal offenses, the prosecution moved for a court
order to compel defendant to submit to a tape recording of his voice in
order that a voice graph could be made of the recording and such graph
compared with another tape recording already in the possession of the
prosecutor. Determining that defendant would be free to speak upon any
subject of his choosing, the court granted this motion.
Emphasizing that it was in no way passing upon the admissibility of
the recording then in the possession of the prosecution, the court discounted
defendant's claim that the requested order would violate his privilege against
self-incrimination and the minimal requirements of due process. Likening
the recording to finger-printing and photographing, the court stated that
the prosecution's motion did not request "communicative" or "testimonial"
evidence protected by the fifth amendment but only the opportunity to
examine a "physical characteristic" of the defendant The decision appears
to be completely consistent with the Supreme Court's recent opinion in
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), where it was determined
that no constitutional guarantee is abridged by extracting blood from an
individual to ascertain whether he is under the influence of intoxicating
liquor.
CONTRACTS
VETERANS' BENEFITS - RESTITUTION FOR FALSE OATH - United States
v'. Shanks, 263 F. Supp. 1012 (D.C. Colo. 1966). - In a restitution action
for hospitalization benefits received under the Veterans Administration by
defendant for a non-service-connected disability, the Government charged
that the oath given by defendant, stating that he was unable to defray the
expenses of hospitalization, was untrue and that therefore it was entitled to
restitution for the benefits erroneously given.
The district court, in dismissing the action, held that the legislative in-
tent was that such an oath constituted conclusive evidence of the defendant's
right to the benefits; thus the Government was precluded from investigat-
ing the truth of the sworn oath. Once the oath was sworn, the benefits
were correctly, not erroneously given. The court noted that it was for the
legislature, not the courts, to correct any abuses made possible by the act.
CORPORATIONS
SECURITIES ExCHANGE ACT - FRAUDULENT REGISTEATION STATEMENT
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- Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967). - In a class action
plaintiffs, purchasers of shares in a corporation, sued its directors by utiliz-
ing section 11 of the Securities Exchange Act for losses resulting from ma-
terial misstatements made in the registration statement and prospectus ac-
companying the issuance of new shares in the corporation. One group of
plaintiffs had purchased the new shares issued pursuant to the false state-
ment, and the other group had purchased regular shares subsequent to the
new issue. The district court granted judgment for those plaintiffs who
had purchased the new shares but denied recovery to those who had pur-
chased regular shares. On appeal the latter group argued that section 11
provided a remedy to all who purchased subsequent to the false registration
statement, not merely to those new share purchasers who could trace their
loss directly to the fraudulent statement.
In affirming the district court's decision, the appellate court followed
the majority view, giving a narrow interpretation to section 11. Pointing
out that the purpose of the Securities Exchange Act is to provide full dis-
closure in the registration of shares and to prevent fraud in their sale, the
court stated that section 11 provides a remedy specifically for those who
are injured directly by fraud in the registration of shares and that other
sections of the statute provide remedies for 'those otherwise injured by
fraud. Therefore, to allow appellants to recover, the court felt, would dilute
the remedy specifically provided for purchasers of new shares.
COURTS
STAY OF PROCEEDINGS - DISCRETON - Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103
(4th Cir. 1967). - Plaintiffs brought a shareholder derivative suit in a
state court against defendant corporation and eight of its officers, challeng-
ing the validity of stock options. The state court ordered plaintiffs to post
security, whereupon plaintiffs brought a diversity action in a federal district
court, omitting resident defendants as parties. The district court stayed
proceedings on motion by defendant because of the pending state action.
In following a similar decision of the Second Circuit, the Fourth Circuit
held that a stay of proceedings, while ordinarily interlocutory, was discre-
tionary with the court where there was a state action pending and was
appealable in the instant case since the stay was equivalent to a dismissal.
CRIMINAL LAW
EVIDENCE RELEVANT TO OFFENSE - LOCAL LAw - Ross v'. Maroney,
372 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1967). - Defendant was convicted of murdering
his common law wife; the jury had been continually reminded during the
trial that he had also killed her son. Defendant petitioned the district
court for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied.
On appeal, defendant alleged that the admission of the testimony re-
garding the prior homicide was irrelevant and highly prejudicial. The court
adopted the prevailing view that the admissibility in a murder trial of evi-
dence of a similar crime to establish intent, design, and system on the part
of the accused is left by the fourteenth amendment to state law. The
court held that under Pennsylvania law the admission of testimony of the
prior killing was relevant. More significantly, the court held that the ad-
mission of testimony on behalf of the state showing that defendant had
committed another homicide prior to the time he allegedly committed the
one for which he was being tried was not a denial of due process of law
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where the relevancy of such evidence to show intent, design, and motive
bore directly upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
DIVORCE
EXTEEm CRUELTY - DRUG ADDICTION - Melia v. Melk, 94 NJ. Super.
47, 226 A.2d 745 (1967). - In an action for divorce, plaintiff proved that
defendant, as a result of addiction to heroin over a period of years, was
unable and unwilling to have sexual relations. Defendant also refused any
aid to overcome his addiction. Plaintiffs health was thereby impaired
physically and mentally, and she was prevented from discharging her duties
as a wife and mother. The court held that such addiction, by a dissipator
as opposed to a medically adduced addict, accompanied by the resultant
attrition of sexual powers and the impairment of plaintiffs health, war-
ranted an absolute divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty.
Under New Jersey law, this case establishes a new instance of extreme
cruelty, not a new ground for divorce. Ordinarily, a divorce is allowed on
the extreme cruelty ground because the defendant has engaged in wrongful
conduct accompanied by willfullness or malice and thus subverts the family
relationship. This course of conduct tends to cause apprehension of injury
or actually impairs the physical or mental health of the party seeking the
divorce. However, it has been the general rule that drug addiction, im-
potency, or physical incapacity arising after the marriage is not a ground for
divorce in absence of a statute.
GAS
INTETATE Co mmRCE - CA RIERs - Public Serv. Bloc. & Gas Co. v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 371 F.2d I (3d Cir. 1967). - Petitioner gas com-
pany, fearing loss of Texaco, Inc., as a customer to Transcontinental Gas
Pipe Line Corp, sought review of the Federal Power Commission's (FPC)
action under the Natural Gas Act in disclaiming jurisdiction over Texaco.
Texaco delivered gas in Texas to Transcontinental to be commingled with
other gas and delivered to Texaco in New Jersey. The Commission had
held that this was not a "sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for re-
sale" within the meaning of the Natural Gas Act and that Texaco was
not required to submit to FPC regulation.
Petitioner argued that the commingling and delivery arrangement be-
tween Texaco and Transcontinental would involve an exchange of gas made
available by Texaco for commingled gas ultimately redelivered by Trans-
continental to Texaco in New Jersey, thus requiring the transaction to be
treated as a "sale" subject to FPC regulation. The court affirmed the FPC's
original order and held there was no "sale," reasoning that there was no
exchange since an essential ingredient of exchange is a transfer of title, and
this was dearly not intended by the parties. The transaction between Tex-
aco and Transcontinental was nothing more than the bailment of a fungible
commodity, therefore falling outside Natural Gas Act regulation.
INSURANCE
FIDELITY, GUARANTY, AND LIABILITY INSURANCE - NAMED INSURED OR
MEMBER OF FAMILY - State Farm Mtt. Auto. Ins. Co. v'. Thompson, 372
F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1967). - Plaintiff was injured while riding as a pas-
senger in a car driven by one Bailleres. At the time, plaintiff was living
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with Bailleres, thinking that they were legally married. Shortly after the
accident plaintiff left -the man when she learned that they were not really
married. Plaintiff brought this action against defendant insurance company
to recover under an insurance policy which named Bailleres as the insured.
In affirming a summary judgment for plaintiff, the court rejected the com-
pany's defense that they were not liable because of a provision in the policy
excluding liability for bodily injury to the insured or any "member of the
family of the insured."
The court followed the rule that where an insurance policy is ambigu-
ous, it will be interpreted in the light most favorable to the insured. Since
the purpose of the "family" exclusionary clause is to exempt the insurer from
liability to those persons to whom the insured is likely to be partial in case
of injury, it has no application here since the relationship between plaintiff
and Bailieres did not have a permanent domestic character such as would
make Bailleres partial to the plaintiff.
JUDGMENTS
CAUSES OF ACTION AND DEFENSES MERGED, BARRED, OR CONCLUDED -
WHAT CONSTITUTES DlSTINCr CAUSES OF ActIoN - McMenomy v.
Ryden, 148 N.W.2d 804 (Minn. 1967). - In 1962 the Securities Ex-
change Commission (SEC) brought an action under the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940 against defendants, charging them with gross misconduct
and gross abuse of trust. Shortly thereafter, the present derivative action
was commenced in the state court by minority shareholders of the corpora-
tion against the same defendants. The complaints in the two actions were
almost identical. When the SEC case went to trial, the defendants were
absolved of the charges. Defendants, relying on the doctrine of res judicata,
then moved for summary judgment in this derivative suit, contending that
the SEC action barred further proceedings in the state court.
The court, in denying defendants' motion, followed the general rule that
before the doctrine of res judicata is applicable, the complaints must involve
the same cause of action and the parties must be the same or in privity
with one another. In this case there was no privity since the SEC did not
represent the shareholders in the first case, nor was the cause of action the
same since different tests of liability were applicable in the two cases.
LABOR RELATIONS
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES - UNION AcTVrIEs - Indiana Gear Works
v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1967). - The Board ordered appellant
to reinstate an employee who had been fired for displaying cartoons ridi-
culing the company's president and its recent pay increase. The Board
claimed that the cartoons were a form of complaint which was a concerted
activity protected by the National Labor Relations Act.
The court of appeals, in overruling the decision of the Board, held that
this was not group action and that from the facts of the case, no group
action of any kind was intended or contemplated. In following a number
of decisions defining protected concerted activity, the court held that here
the employee was acting on his own personal whim and that the company
did not violate the act by his discharge.
LICENSES
FOR OCCUPATIONS AND PRIVILEGES - SALE OF STOCKS, BONDS, AND
1816 [Vol. 18: 1809
OTHER SEcumTIES - Tcherepnin v. Knight, 371 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1967).
- Plaintiffs, depositors in an Illinois savings and loan association, filed an
action in the federal district court seeking to have their shares declared void
and to be declared creditors of the association which, subsequent to their
deposits, had entered into voluntary liquidation. Plaintiffs' claim that the
federal district court had jurisdiction was based on the assumption that the
withdrawable capital accounts were "securities" within the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act and that the anti-fraud provisions and relevant regulations
thereunder were therefore applicable. The district court denied defendants
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
In what appears to be a case of first impression, the court of appeals
held that a withdrawable capital account in an Illinois-chartered savings and
loan association is not a "security" under -the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and that therefore the anti-fraud provisions of the act are not appli-
cable. The federal district court was accordingly found to have lacked juris-
diction over the action.
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT - PRESENTATION OF CLAiI AGAINST ESTATE
OF DECEDENT - Peinberg v. United States, 18 N.Y.S.2d 499, 223 N.E.2d
790 (1966). - Respondent, the United States Government, instituted a
proceeding to compel appellants to settle accounts for deficiency assessments
eight years after the assessments were made. Appellants moved to dismiss
the proceeding, asserting that the proceeding was barred by the statute of
limitations in the Internal Revenue Code which provides that income and
estate taxes can be collected only if a suit is commenced within six years
after the assessment of the taxes. The surrogate court held that respondent
was too late in pressing its tax claims. The appellate division reversed.
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the order of the appellate divi-
sion. The court stated that when Congress has legislated in an area of dif-
fering state rules without making provision for such diversity, the courts
have construed this to mean that each state should adopt the appropriate
local rule as the applicable federal law. The court held that under New
York law the filing of a verified claim with the representatives of an estate
was the commencement of a special proceeding that tolled the statutes of
limitations in the Internal Revenue Code so as to permit a suit by re-
spondent to compel accounting eight years after the assessments.
MEC-ANICS' LIENS
PROTECTION OF SUBCONTRACTORS, LABORERS, OR MATERIALMEN - OHIO
REVISED CODE SECTION 1311.26 - Turzillo Contracting Co. v. Cincin-
nati Metropolitan Housing Authority, 10 Ohio St 2d 5 (1967). - Plaintiff
subcontractor was granted a summary judgment in an action brought against
the general contractor and the Metropolitan Housing Authority for work
done prior to his dismissal from the construction of a building. The judg-
ment was based upon Orno REV. CODE sections 131126, .28, .31, and .32,in effect prior to the 1963 amendments, and specifically upon the findingthat the general contractor had terminated his rights against the subcontrac-tor by assenting to the latter's claim sent to the owner, Metropolitan. The
court of appeals affirmed, but the supreme court reversed, holding,, inter
alia, that while the general contractor's failure to manifest his intenton to
dispute the claim submitted by the contractor constitutes an assent to its
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correctness under section 1311.31, it does not amount to an assent that it
is due until it has been determined that the subcontractor has satisfactorily
performed his contract.
The statutes in question afford a species of garnishment to protect the
subcontractor against loss of payments due him which might reach his prin-
cipal contractor and in whose hands they might be subject to his creditors
or his capriciousness. Although of long standing, the statutes had received
but a cursory examination by -the supreme court until this case. The court's
approach signified the fact that these statutes will not be interpreted strictly
but will receive a construction commensurate with the purpose sought to
be accomplished.
MONOPOLIES
COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE - -No-SwITCHNG" AGREE-
MENTS - Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir.
1967).- Subsequent to plaintiff's dismissal as sales supervisor for de-
fendant P.F. Collier, Inc., he was immediately employed in a similar capac-
ity by defendant Spencer International Press, Inc. However, because of an
agreement among Collier, Spencer, and certain other encyclopedia manufac-
turers that no employee of a competitor would be hired until six months
after the termination of the former employment, Spencer discharged plain-
tiff and refused to re-engage him until the expiration of the prescribed
period. Alleging that adherence to the "no-switching" agreement violated
section 2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, plaintiff brought an action for
treble damages pursuant to section 4 of the Clayton Act. The district court
granted defendants' motions for summary judgment, holding that no anti-
trust violation occurred.
In reversing this judgment, the circuit court determined that although
the antitrust laws may not be utilized for preserving freedom in the labor
market nor regulating employment practices, nevertheless, "no-switching"
agreements may "impair full and free competition in the supply of a ser-
vice or commodity to the public." Consequently, the granting of a summary
judgment was found to be improper, for plaintiff may have been able to
prove that the "no-switching" agreement discouraged labor mobility to the
extent that it impeded the establishment and development of new encyclo-
pedia industries. This decision reaffirmed the general rule regarding such
agreements.
TRUSTS AND OTHER COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE - TRADE
ASSOCIATIONS IN GENERAL - Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., 371 F.2d 409
(7th Cir. 1967). - Appellants, as shareholders in several mutual funds,
brought a derivative class action for and on behalf of all shareholders of
these funds. In this class action appellants sought treble damages against
appellees, the New York Stock Exchange and four of its member firms, for
alleged violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. According to appellants,
the alleged infraction consisted of engaging in a conspiracy to fix minimum,
uniform rates for brokerage commissions. On these allegations, the district
court granted summary judgment for the appellees.
In its affirmation, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that although the Securi-
ties Exchange Act did not expressly exempt the exchange from the antitrust
laws, the court would nonetheless imply an exemption in order to effectuate
the purposes of the act. Consequently, the court held that the fixing of
1818 [Vol. 18: 1809
CASES NOTED
minimum commissions did not violate the antitrust laws since the deter-
mination of commission rates was a regulatory function of the exchange.
Thus, the Seventh Circuit followed the prevailing state view that rules of
an exchange which require its members to charge a uniform and fixed com-
mission for their services do not violate antitrust statutes.
NEGLIGENCE
DuTy T6 MITIGATE DAMAGES - USE OF SEAT BELTS - Lipscomb v.
Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914 (Del Super. Ct. 1967). - An auto accident be-
tween plaintiff and defendant resulted in a negligence suit. In a pre-trial
motion to amend -his answer, defendant sought to assert the affirmative de-
fense that plaintiff failed to wear seat belts and thus show plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence and avoidable damages. In turn, plaintiff sought to
have any evidence of a failure to use seat belts declared inadmissible. The
court held that such evidence was inadmissible because of the "absence of
a meaningful standard for judgment by the trier of fact."
This case questions whether the failure to use seat belts demonstrates
contributory negligence and thus bars recover entirely or whether it comes
under the rule of avoidable damages which requires apportionment of the
damages. A few jurisdictions have allowed such evidence to be considered
as part of the surrounding circumstances, while others do not allow such
evidence on the ground that there is a danger of conjecture, or on the
ground that it would create a new common law. This court felt that jury
verdicts may be altered or that apportionment of damages may be very
difficult or impossible.
UNINTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION - CIVIL ENGINEERS - Craig v.
Everset# M. Brooks Co., 222 N.E.2d 752 (Mass. 1967). - Plaintiff, a gen-
eral contractor, and defendant, a civil engineer, were employed by a third
party, but neither were in privity of contract with each other. Plaintiff
entered into the contract after having seen defendant's plans, and defendant
knew the identity of plaintiff and that plaintiff would rely on defendant's
execution of the plans. The contractor alleged pecuniary damages, asserting
negligent misrepresentation on the part of the engineer. The court was
thus faced with the issue of whether the lack of privity of contract between
the parties would protect defendant.
In reversing the lower court by holding that plaintiff was not so barred,
the court established a new rule of law by extending prior Massachusetts
cases which had merely denied privity of contract as a defense in personal
injury actions. By having emphasized the identity and reliance factors,
Massachusetts appears to be a pioneer, along with at least ,three other juris-
dictions, in expanding the duty owed by one professional to another, al-
though no contractual relation exists.
SALES
CREDIT CARDS - Loss - Allied Stores of New York, Inc. v. Funderburke,
277 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Civ. Ct. Rec. 1967). - Defendant, unaware of the loss
or theft of her credit card, could not notify the department store as required
by the credit agreement and by New York statute. Plaintiff store sought
to hold defendant liable for 237 purchases totaling $2,460 made in a one-
month period. Defendant contended that the store's business conduct of
allowing 237 sales slips bearing forged signatures to accumulate in a thirty-
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day period contributed to its loss. Plaintiff argued that it was unable to
minimize defendant's liability until it sorted and collected all outstanding
sales slips and processed them through its data-processing equipment.
The court reasoned that it was manifestly unfair to shift the burdens of
the inadequacies of data-processing systems to the innocent consumer and
denied defendant's liability, holding that while there is a duty on -the part
of the credit card holder to exercise reasonable care over the card, there is
a concurrent duty on the issuer to protect its customers from the imposition
of unjust charges.
TORTS
INJURIES TO PROPERTY - INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS - Smith v. Lock-
head Propulsion Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (Ct. App. 1967). - Appellants
instituted a suit based on negligence and strict -tort liability to recover dam-
ages to their property allegedly caused by seismic vibrations activated by a
static firing rocket motor test conducted by respondent on adjoining lands.
Respondent, an independent contractor, contended that he was entitled to
share the immunity of -the Government since he had performed the rocket
motor test pursuant to a contract with the United States. The superior
court entered a judgment of nonsuit against the appellants.
In reversing the superior court, the court of appeals held that respondent
was strictly liable for the damages that resulted from the test firing of the
rocket motor since it was an ultra-hazardous activity. The court adopted
the prevailing view that an independant contractor is not entitled to the
protective shield of immunity because he is performing a government con-
tract.
WITNESSES
INADMISSIBLE STATEMENTS - USE FOR IMPEACHMENT - State v. Brew-
ton, 422 P.2d 581 (Ore. 1967). - At trial, the court held that written
statements elicited from defendant during police interrogation were inad-
missible as evidence in chief because he had not been warned of his fifth
and sixth amendment rights. However, after defendant testified in his own
behalf as to facts inconsistent with these written statements, -the court per-
mitted that state to introduce the prior statements for the limited purpose
of impeachment. On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed the con-
viction.
The principal issue in the case was whether inadmissible police-station
admissions may nevertheless be used for impeachment purposes. A majority
of the court concluded that to permit such a practice would be to allow the
state to store up a wealth of inadmissible evidence against a defendant in
case he chose to testify, thus undoing much of the progress recently made
in upgrading police practices to preserve constitutional rights. Two dis-
senting opinions adhered to the traditional distinction between the admissi-
bility of a statement as evidence in chief and for impeachment purposes.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
COMPENSABLE INJURIES - SUBSEQUENT AGGRAVATING INJURY - In-
mer & Co. v. Brosnahan, 152 S.E.2d 254 (Va. 1967). - Plaintiff, who had
suffered a compensable injury, was returning to work after consulting a
physician when he suffered a blackout (apparently due to a pre-existing
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vascular condition) and crashed his personal automobile. The Workmen's
Compensation Board determined that injuries suffered in the crash were
compensable; the employer appealed.
Presented with this case of first impression, the Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals, noting the split of authority in other jurisdictions, chose to fol-
low -the majority view. Staring that the employee was under a duty to
follow his employer's directives in getting medical aid, the court felt the
injured man was in the course of his employment when the crash occurred
just as if he had been making a service call The court reasoned that when
the hazards of highway travel united with his pre-existing condition to
cause the injury, there was established the necessary causal connection to
allow recovery.
INJUmES FOR Wiucm COMPENSATION MAY BE HAD - INJUmES BY
ACTS OF CO-EMPLOYEES - Blue Diamond Coal Co,. v. Creech, 411 S.W.2d
331 (Ky. 1967). - Plaintiffs' decedent had continued working in de-
fiance of picket lines. As he was travelling home approximately an hour
after quitting time, he drove his truck through a picket line set up on the
public highway and the truck was struck by a rock. The decedent pointed
a rifle out of the truck window and was then fatally shot by one of the
pickets. The Workmen's Compensation Board denied compensation on the
ground that the death was not in the course of employment The decision
was reversed by the circuit court, and the court of appeals affirmed.
The court found that although the decedent had finished his regular
work and had left his work station, he was still performing a service for
his employer in risking violence at the hands of the pickets. The court
found support for its decision in the writings of Professor Larson, in opin-
ions of the New York Court of Appeals written by Chief Justice Cardozo,
and in the case law of Kentucky. The decision represents the modern view.
TAXATION
ASSESSMENT OF TAXES - PROCEDURE AND ENFORCEMENT - United
States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1967). - The United States ap-
pealed from an order of the district court denying a petition by the Gov-
ernment to secure enforcement under section 7604 (a) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code of a summons directing defendant to produce appraisal reports
relating to property owned by an estate of which defendant was the executor
and attorney. The court of appeals held that enforcement should be al-
lowed since the appraisal reports could not be successfully defended as priv-
ileged from disclosure either under the attorney-client privilege or the law-
yer "work product" doctrine of material gathered in anticipation of litiga-
tion.
The doctrine of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) has been
applied in civil actions to block the discovery under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure of memoranda, statements, and mental impressions pre-
pared or obtained by counsel in preparation for litigation. The result of the
present decision is to recognize that the power of the Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue to investigate the records and affairs of taxpayers is greater
than that of a party in civil litigation.
ASSESSMENT OF TAXES - REMAND OF CAUSE - Robida v. Commissioner,
371 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1967). - In this proceeding to review an unre-
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ported tax court decision, petitioner denied tax deficiencies for the years
1956 to 1961 for income from slot machines in service dubs in Germany.
Petitioner, who had reported the income on his returns, alleged such revenue
was exempt under section 911 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. He
further claimed that certain of his personal records which were seized by
German police in 1963 had been obtained by the Revenue Service but were
not made available to him and -that without them he was unable to recall
and explain facts that would aid him in his contentions.
The court of appeals accepted the respondent's motion for remand "in
the interest of complete fairness," but refused to limit the proceedings on
remand, holding that petitioner should be allowed to use all discovery pro-
cedures and to assert all defenses, including the statute of limitations, he
might have to the claim.
Loss CARRYOVERS - LIBSON SHOPS DOCTRINE - Jackson Oldsmobile,
Inc. v. United States, 371 F.2d 808 (5th Cit. 1967). - In 1955 Leland
Jackson agreed with General Motors Corporation, majority shareholder in
the taxpayer corporation, to become a minority shareholder in the pre-
existing automobile sales franchise that had been managed at a loss in 1952
and 1953 by a previous minority shareholder. In its 1956 and 1957 income
tax returns, the taxpayer corporation attempted to carry forward as a deduc-
tion the previous net operating losses of the corporation in 1952 and 1953.
After paying the amounts disallowed as deductions by the Commissioner,
the taxpayer brought suit in federal district court for refund of the contested
deductions.
The district court held that the taxpayer was entitled to the deductions
on the ground that the doctrine of Lisbon Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S.
382 (1957), barring loss deductions, was inapplicable because there had
not been a complete change in the ownership of the taxpayer corporation
between 1953 and 1955, and because there had not been an alteration in the
nature of the taxpayer's business. The district court also ruled that sections
269 and 382 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 were not applicable
to bar the deductions, for Jackson never did acquire "control" of the tax-
payer during the relevant years. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, expressly ap-
proving the district court's reasoning, without a further discussion of the
issues.
SUMMONS - STATUTE Op IaMITATIONS - Hinchcliff v. Clarke, 371 F.2d
697 (6th Cir. 1967). - In an examination of Hinchdiff's tax returns for
1957 to 1959, Garf, a certified public accountant in possession of Hinch-
cliff's financial records, turned over several working papers, which contained
information for prior years in which the taxpayer's returns had been exam-
ined, to an internal revenue agent. At the taxpayer's request, the account-
ant demanded the return of the records. The agent served the accountant
a summons for the same records that he returned. Some of the years con-
cerned extended beyond the statute of limitations.
At the trial which resulted after the accountant's refusal to comply with
the summons, the taxpayer argued that section 7605(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 limited the "unnecessary examination" of the tax-
payer's "books of account" and that the accountant was merely his agent.
The court held that an accountant's work papers are his own and that he is
an independent contractor. Since section 7605(b) was held to apply only
to the taxpayer and the records in his possession, the records in the posses-
1822 [Vol. 18: 1809
1967] CASES NOTED 1823
sion of the account were subject to the summons without any 7605 (b)
limitation. The court also rZejected the district court's application of Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), which forbids judicial warrants for
searches and seizures of a person's papers in a search for evidence of fraud
against the revenue law, holding that Boyd did not apply in a search for
evidence in a civil proceeding. However, it was held that no criminal
prosecution could be undertaken as a result of information obtained from
such records.
